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Tension in Intersectional Agency; A Theoretical Discussion of the Interior Conflict 
of White, Feminist Activists’ Intersectional Location 
 




In this article I question the wholeness of the agency of white, feminist activists. 
Drawing on intersectional theory, I problematise the multiplicative character of their 
location in order to be able to understand how intersectional agency operates. This 
location reveals three layers of intersectionality; the junction of axes of social 
signification (gender and race); the junction of manifestations on these axes (female and 
white); and the junction of, subsequent, positions in power relations (disadvantaged and 
advantaged). I argue that this is specifically important and complex when we explore how 
whiteness can operate intersectionally. This results in three observations. First, this 
intersectional junction is conflictive in its interior; race as advantage and gender as 
disadvantage can operate as opposite structuring forces in power relations. Second, 
feminist activism is characterised by gendered action and aims at social transformation in 
the realm of gender. Whiteness, on the other hand, is often marked by racial passivity and 
omission via which it can invest in the maintenance of the racial status quo and non-
change; this contradicts feminist objectives. Third, contra the conflation of agency with 
action, I agree that not every action is agentic. If not every action is agentic, then not all 
agency generates action. In turn, this means that agency can also result in omission; 
‘something’ which is not action, i.e. an absence or void of action or, what I call, inaction. 
We can say that inaction is a familiar manifestation of hegemonic processes as whiteness. 
In turn, we can see that gender and race as structuring forces, subsequently, shape agency 
contradictorily, which can generate action and inaction simultaneously. The 
differentiation of layers in intersectional theory suggests that the agency of white, 
feminist activists is mobilised within a conceptual opposition in power relations that, 
consequently, questions the ‘wholeness’ of intersectional agency.  
 
Keywords: Intersectional theory, Agency, White women 
 
Introduction 
 Racism affects both black and white people, but the effects are different; racial 
discrimination has disadvantageous consequences for black people, but secures (the 
maintenance of the system of) race privilege for the latter. (Bento, 2003, p. 147). 
Whiteness, argued Frankenberg (1997, pp. 8-9), expresses “the idea that there is a 
category of people identified and self-identifying as ‘white’, situated within this 
simultaneous operation of race and racism. White, then corresponds to one place in 
racism as a system of categorization and subject formation, just as the terms race 
                                               
1 (Dieuwertje.Huijg@manchester.ac.uk) Dieuwertje Dyi Huijg is a PhD candidate in Sociology, University 
of Manchester. Her project concerns the intersectional agency of racially privileged young, feminist 
activists from São Paulo. Relying on a phenomenological methodology, she aims at understanding how, in 
the context of opposite positions in power relations, intersectional agency is experienced, negotiated, 
mobilised and (re)produced by the individual who aims at social change. This research is grounded in her 
activist background in the women’s movement in the Netherlands and Brazil.  
 
This journal and its contents may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or  
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form 
to anyone is expressly forbidden. ©2012 Journal of International Women’s Studies.
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privileged and race dominant name particular places within racism as a system of 
domination.”. Intersectional agency, as I suggest in the title, is – at least on an analytical 
level – intrinsically tensional in the case of white, feminist activists; it is their whiteness, 
as an advantageous location in relations of power that complicates their agency. I argue 
that it is important to develop a more complex model of intersectionality in order to 
include the working of whiteness in its analysis. Consisting of three layers of analysis, 
this model draws attention to intersectionality as a framework of power relations. With 
white feminist activism in mind, this model demands, subsequently, the consideration of 
two possible manifestations of agency, namely action and, what I name, inaction - the 
void or absence of action. 
 To present this problem, I would like to introduce you to Juliana2. She 
participated in a research project (2005-06) on the everyday experiences with race 
privilege for which I interviewed young, white3
 
, female activists from São Paulo. Her 
reflections might differ in degree and form from the other participants and other (young) 
white feminists but demonstrate similar tension with respect to intersectional agency. 
Juliana: “It makes me feel uncomfortable to define me as white. […] there 
is the whole [historical] weight that you carry with you being white. You 
being white, you are the oppressive being of racism. […] As an institution, 
man represents the oppressor and woman the oppressed. In the racial 
question it is the same thing; White represents the oppressor and black the 
oppressed” “[I] do not like to know that I am in a better position because 
of being white.” “I am super contra racism.” “Maybe because I am a 
woman and I know what it is to be a victim in some situations, I end up 
transposing this also to other situations: ‘I suffer this for being a woman, 
and he suffers this for being a black’” “[I] am more involved in other 
issues, I follow the racial question little, but the little I follow, I, like, 
admire.”  
 
 Juliana racially self-identifies as white and situates herself in the system of 
racism. She recognises the structural privilege that her racial position grants her as well 
as its historical context. She is also explicit about the uncomfortable feelings this 
consciousness brings her. In a multi-axes context, though, Juliana dislocates from race to 
gender (what I will later call layer 1) in order to jump in power relations from advantage 
to disadvantage (layer 3). Now she focuses on her female position (layer 2 as a 
manifestation of layer 1) and, through the comparison of different forms of social 
inequality, connects structural disadvantageous complications of her own gender position 
with the disadvantageous complications black people encounter on the axis of race.  
 As a feminist activist herself, Juliana vocalises strong opposition to the system of 
racism. This ideological persuasion is accompanied by feelings of admiration for those 
who struggle against racial inequality. Also her own activism is formed by a struggle 
against inequality, i.e. for the improvement of her individual and categorical position on 
the axes of gender and sexuality. But despite this and despite her discursive support of the 
                                               
2 Juliana is a pseudonym.  
3 Though all activists experience race privilege, their actual racial identity is often more complex than 
‘white’  (see Huijg, 2011). 
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struggle against racism, her feminist activism is not practically informed by her racially 
privileged position and consciousness. Intersectionally, the agentic manifestation in her 
activism demonstrates a tensional relation to its objective of social change. On the axis of 
gender she manifests her agency actively (through feminism), on the axis of race, though, 
her activist agency is simultaneously marked by omission (inaction).  
In accordance with Nash’s call (2008, p. 10) to understand the intersectional 
agency of white feminists, it is necessary to explore the different ways the axes of race 
and gender operate and specifically how whiteness can work in relation to feminist 
activist agency. White feminists have an ambiguous relation to their whiteness; they 
might identify as white and recognise the racially privileged consequences of this 
position, but this recognition can equally flourish in its omission in feminist activist 
praxis, i.e. when anti-racism is non-performative (Ahmed, 2004). And even if they do 
(practically) engage with anti-racism, it is not necessarily, as other interviews showed 
(Huijg, 2011), that they act as white activists in the struggle against racial inequality and 
discrimination. Ideologically, they make a distinction in their activism between the 
oppressor and the oppressed, between the system that oppresses, those who belong to that 
system and those who suffer from that oppression. Their struggle opposes this system, 
which facilitates their gendered activism. As women they are not part of the oppressive 
side in the system of inequalities; their struggle is directed outwards, against the sexist 
system and/or men who ‘represent the oppressor’. From their racial position, however, 
they are included in this system and benefit from its subsequent social inequality; if they 
do not individually oppress (in potency), they do, as Juliana exemplified, ‘represent the 
oppressor’. This creates tension between their position on the axis of gender and that on 
the axis of race; representationally, they are located both inside and outside the system 
that they, at least ideologically and discursively, oppose.  
 In this essay, though, I will not analyse fieldwork data, but theoretically explore 
the intersectional tension outlined above. In order to do that, I will briefly explore the 
history of intersectionality, give an impression of intersectional theory and situate white 
feminists therein. Then I will propose, first, that intersectionality should not solely be 
understood as the junction of axes of social signification but also as the junction of 
positions in power relations. Second, in order to uncover this tension in relation to power, 
I will argue for the differentiation of layers of intersectional analysis. In the context of 
power relations in the system of racism, as Wildman and Davis (1995, p. 95) pointed out, 
“what we do not say, what we do not talk about, allows the status quo to continue”; also 
by not acting (not saying, not being involved, etc), as Juliana’s excerpt can be read, one 
can contribute to the maintenance or the modification of – gender or race – relations of 
power. This, lastly, brings the necessity to the forefront to explore agency (in the second 
part of the article) in multiple ways and, contra the conflation of agency with action, 
analyse agency exercised via both action and inaction. 
 
Towards Intersectionality 
 In the Second Wave, ‘Global Sisterhood’ was the (supposed) grounds for 
commonality between women, which “despite variations in degree [was] experienced by 
all human beings who are born female.” (Morgan 1984 in Mohanty, 1995, p. 73). Morgan 
asked: “Do we not, after all, recognize one another?” (Ibid, p. 77) ‘No!’ contradicted 
black and other feminists clearly. Via the monism of feminism (King, 1988), in which 
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gender is taken as a “single analytical category” (McCall, 2005, p. 1771), the “double 
oppression” (Torrey, 1979), “intersectional marginalization” (Strolovitch, 2006), 
“multiple jeopardy” (King, 1988) or the “matrix of domination” (Collins, 1990) of sexism 
and racism were neglected. ‘Global Sisterhood’ was “an ahistorical notion of the 
sameness of [women’s] oppression” (Mohanty, 1995, p. 74) that, via the denial of the 
specific location of hegemonic femininities (where racial analysis uncovers its 
whiteness), obscured intra-group differences. In response to this ‘common’ experience 
and long before ‘intersectionality’ was introduced as such, feminists of colour4
The theory of intersectionality, following the aforementioned ‘theoretical and 
political commitment’ (Nash, 2008, p. 3), was an analytical response to the myth of 
racially neutral gendered sameness (hooks, 1997, pp. 167-169) and its subsequent 
whiteness. It was the theoretical end to the singular notion of ‘woman’, which, with the 
recognition of inter-axis differences and a theoretical turn to intra-axis differences, turned 
into the notion of ‘women’. (Crenshaw, 1991) Where the idea of woman pointed to a 
homogenising conceptualisation of gender, women offered a non-unified, differentiated, 
hence a multiple category; as an axis of social signification and analysis, gender in 
isolation was, at least in theory, rejected.  
 
questioned their marginalisation, the exclusion of the ‘specificity’ of their gendered and 
raced experiences and demanded recognition of sexism and racism as simultaneous 
markers of black and ethnic minority women’s lives outside and inside the women’s 
movement and feminism and, doing so, revealed its whiteness. (Carrilho, 1981; Essed, 
1982; Gonzalez, 1981; hooks, 1981; Roland, 2000; Santos, 1999; Torrey, 1979) 
But the recognition of intra-axis differences in itself and even the introduction of 
other axes into a multi-axes framework do not necessarily lead to intersectional analysis. 
The tendency to understand gender and race as parallel axes in which boxes are ticked 
(Bowleg, 2008), said to co-exist but are not intertwined, leads to a separate approach of 
axes as independent. In this framework, the lives of women of colour are located at 
“mutually exclusive terrains” (Crenshaw, 1991, pp. 1240-1241). At most, their individual 
(or group specific) experiences would be an additive or accumulative ‘sum’ of their 
separate categorical belongings. Intersectional theory, in turn, served to “reject the 
‘single-axis framework’”, to “subvert race/gender binaries” (Nash, 2008, pp. 2-3); it 
offered a perspective to problematise the multiple and mutually influential oppressions 
and subsequent specific reality that black and ethnic minority women live. This is not just 
‘specific’ because black women experience “multiple jeopardy” (King, 1988), as 





 In response to the absence of an adequate analytic tool, i.e. a multi-axis 
framework that would problematise parallel and additive or accumulate approaches (as 
shown below in Table 1), Crenshaw (1989, 1991) coined the term intersectionality. This 
                                               
4 In this article I will use ‘black women’, ‘black and ethnic minority women’ and ‘women of colour’ 
interchangeably in reference to the variety in racial self-identification in the countries (Brazil, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States) in which this article is academically grounded.  
5 See for a discussion on the methodology of intersectionality for example Bowleg (2008) and McCall’s 
(2005) analysis. 
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responded to a void in feminist and race critical (legal) theory leading to the ‘theoretical 
erasure’ of black women through “single-axis analysis” and offered a framework through 
which the “multidimensionality of Black women’s experience” could be understood. 
(Crenshaw, 1989, p. 139, emphasis mine). Intersectionality, then, “predominantly aims to 
reveal the unilateral power of social representations, e.g. the detrimental symbolic and 
material consequences for those groups whose lives are situated at the crossroads of 
different identities.” (Saharso 2002, p. 22 in Prins, 2006, p. 280) In other words, 
intersectionality is “the notion that subjectivity is constituted by mutually reinforcing 
vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality” (Nash, 2008, p. 2), through “interlinking 
grids of differential positionings” (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 199), which construct 
“relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject 
formations” (McCall, 2005, p. 1771) Not only are race and gender, racism and sexism 
intrinsically intertwined, they are also intrinsically different. They have different 
outcomes, separately and in their junction (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1989, p. 140; King, 
1988, p. 45; Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 199). Against the compartmentalisation of race/racism 
and gender/sexism, this intersectional approach is what King (1988, p. 47) designated as 
the multiplicative relationship of axes; the synergetic junction where axes are mutually 
influential and create a new location where black women(‘s lives) can be comprehended, 
in Lorde’s (1984, pp. 120-121) words, as a ‘meaningful whole’. The different approaches 
in a multi-axes framework, including (multiplicative) intersectionality, could be 
summarised as follows: 
 
 
Table 1: Approaches in multi-axes framework 
 
Intersectional theory, then, has been “devoted to understanding the effects of race, 
class, and gender on women’s identities, experiences, and struggles for empowerment. It 
has been especially concerned,” continues Davis (2008, p. 71), “with the marginalization 
of poor women and women of colour within white, Western feminist theory. (…) [T]he 
focus shifted to how race, class and gender interact in the social and material realities of 
women’s lives to produce and transform relations of power.” In this sense, 
intersectionality has been a theoretical and a political project; the recognition of these 
new locations was aimed at centring “the experiences of subjects whose voices have been 
ignored” and, subsequently, at the empowerment of black and other marginalised women. 
The marginalised side of the intersectional subject offered ‘epistemic advantage’ and, as 
such, a “normative vision of a just society.” (Nash, 2008, pp. 2-3) This romanticised and 
idealised the marginalised side and fixated “black women’s bodies [as] sites of ‘strength’ 
and ‘transcendence’ rather than complex spaces of multiple meanings”. This ignored the 
complexity that intersectionality proposed and, criticised Nash, situated black women in 
the function as “prototypical intersectional subjects” whose experiences were “used as a 
theoretical wedge, designed to demonstrate the shortcomings of conventional feminist 
and anti-racist work.” (Ibid, pp. 7-8). Against the origin of intersectional theory, this 
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reinforced subordination in its multiplicity and, doing so, ignored differences and 
burdened black women and other ‘marginalised subjects’ with this political project. 
 “[P]olitical intersectionality,” argued Crenshaw, “highlights the fact that women 
of color are situated within at least two subordinated groups that frequently pursue 
conflicting political agendas. The need to split one's political energies between two 
sometimes opposing groups is a dimension of intersectional dis-empowerment that men 
of color and white women seldom confront.” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1252) Forced by their 
environment, then, black female activists cannot act as a ‘meaningful whole’. White 
feminists, to the contrary, are privileged by the absence of these conflicts. To limit the 
theoretical and political project of intersectionality to marginalised subjects is 
inconsistent with reality, since white women, even in their ‘absence’, are and also should 
be part of this project. It essentialises groups of women and, disregarding the origins of 
intersectional theory that questioned the homogeneity, hegemony and subsequent 
whiteness of woman, reduces the transformation of power relations to a singular location 
in subordination. This brings two problems to the forefront concerning feminist activism. 
First, it “neglects to describe the ways in which privilege and oppression intersect, 
informing each subject’s experiences” (Nash, 2008, p. 12). This is the case for white 
feminist activists and appears to absolve them from responsibility for this transformative 
project; not only do they not have to split their “political energies” (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 
1252), they also have the privilege to ignore the political agenda that troubles their 
racially advantaged position. Second, this produces a practical problem for the theoretical 
and political project of their activism: how are power relations transformed when the 
location of activist agency is marked by subordination and dominance? Hence, if white, 
feminist activists partake in this project, how do they transform? And what and whom do 
they transform? 
“Everyone,” argued Wekker and Lutz (2001, p. 26), “is situated on a number of 
important axes of social signification." Relations of power imply multiple positions6
 
 on 
these axes – including positions and meanings of domination on other axes. But if 
relations of power are to be transformed, then all voices – including those that 
jeopardised, dominated and marginalised – should transform and be transformed. 
Considering that activism and transformation are manifestations of agency, these voices 
should also be understood as locations where privilege and domination are, agentically, 
negotiated. As such, it is important to comprehend intersectional agency as a location 
that is simultaneously informed by different manifestations of axes and, therefore, 
positions in power relations that generate agency as action and, as Juliana demonstrated 
in the case of whiteness, as inaction. Before exploring the complexity of intersectionality, 
agency and in/action, I would like to elaborate on the position of white feminists. 
White Feminists 
 By taking white feminists as objects of theoretical preoccupation, this article risks 
to reify the normativity of white women in feminism. This was, inter alia, what 
intersectional theory responded to in the first place but what ends up being reproduced in 
intersectional analysis; here, the normativity of white women is not reinscribed through 
negligence of their raciality and race privilege, i.e where “woman” is defined “in terms of 
                                               
6 Additionally, Wekker (1998, p. 48) criticised the intra-axis dichotomy, i.e. the idea that an individual 
cannot have feelings of belonging to both 'we' and 'them', as black and white, on one axis.  
 Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol 13 #2 March 2012  9 
their own experience alone” (Lorde, 1984, p. 117), but by making their racial position 
problematically ‘special’. I argue that it is important to draw attention to the location of 
white women in an intersectional framework and, to be more specific, approach that as 
problematic; this location demonstrates tension in intersectionality that displays racial 
hegemony. The following theoretical points motivate this: 
1. White women can be objects of research through the description of their lives 
and experiences. This can occur without any reference to race, for instance, by taking the 
two axes of social signification (gender and race) as – parallel, additive or multiplicative 
– descriptive denominators. This tends to put white women again at the centre of 
attention without necessarily critically questioning their role in the entirety of power 
relations, which goes against the roots of intersectional theory; to reveal the multiple 
marginalisation and oppression black women suffered and the new location this created 
by the multiplier effect of these axes. Simultaneously, though, uncovering the conflict 
that mono-axis analysis – with a singular and homogenising focus on gender – tended to 
hide, this unfolds the different access to power (resources, etc) black women have in 
comparison to white women. The problematisation of this intra-axis tension at both the 
junction of axes of social signification and of positions in power relations brings to the 
forefront that white women are intersectionally situated at opposite sides in power 
relations. 
2. This location of contradictory structural forces (i.e. the junction of disadvantage 
and advantage) that the intersection of gender and race generates cannot be 
comprehended by a position on either axis nor by the sum of these positions; they are 
mutually influential, consequently synergetically intertwined . This new location is 
created by the multiplier effect of this junction and demonstrates tension ‘in’ this 
junction; “white women are penalized by their gender but privileged by their race. 
Depending on the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed 
group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed.” (Collins, 1990, p. 226) This 
generates the situation where white feminists can be marginalised and can marginalise 
others simultaneously. Intersectionality does not only bring this tension to the forefront 
but it can also be used as a mode to research this tension. 
3. Lastly, in feminist activism white women do not systemically take their specific 
intersectional location into account. It almost goes without saying that the struggle of 
feminism is directed at both sides of power relations, namely contra the disadvantageous 
effects of gender inequality for women and contra the structural benefits for men. 
Recalling the decades long struggle of black and ethnic minority feminists against the 
multiplicative disadvantageous effects they face, it could have been presumed that the 
(multiplicative) structural benefits the system of racial inequality grants white women 
would also be an integral part of white feminists’ analysis and activism. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case. Hence, intersectional analysis that emphasises white feminists’ 
location as a junction of positions in power relations can draw attention to this point and, 
in addition, be mobilised to uncover tension in the activist character of white feminists’ 
agency and the(ir) objective of social change. 
In a context where the intersectional location as a junction of positions in power 
relations is situated on the same side of the ‘power-axis’ (intersectional marginalisation), 
there is common ground in which activism is rooted; activist agency is focused on 
improvement of disadvantaged positions and individual and collective empowerment. But 
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Crenshaw (1991, p. 1252) pointed already to the practical parallel outcomes of ‘political 
intersectionality’ as “conflicting political agendas” and the “need to split one's political 
energies”, a problem that white women do not face. I would like to take this one step 
further; the absence of this problem in itself can be a manifestation of the intersectional 
position of white feminists and relates to their positions on the axes of gender and race 
and to their role in white, feminist activists’ struggle for social transformation. This can 
generate a contradictory manifestation in agency and a conflictive relation to feminism 
and the, ‘general’, objective of social change; assuming a context where white women 
ideologically and practically have a consistent activist approach, a situation in which 
‘they (try to) practice what they preach’, the route towards social justice will be different 
from a gender than from a racial perspective. From their gender perspective, their 
activism is focused on individual, collective empowerment and social improvement of 
their disadvantaged position; as Juliana pointed out, from their ‘oppressed position’ they 
oppose the institution that oppresses (sexism, patriarchy) and men who ‘represent the 
oppressor’. From their racial perspective, though, there is no disadvantaged position in 
their own location that should be improved nor could one say that empowerment would 
lead to social transformation and equal (gendered) race relations; they inhabit the 
institution that oppresses and ‘represent the oppressor’. This leads to a conflict in how 
they ideologically construct their position and role in oppression. (see Huijg, 2011)  
Then, when their activist agency is addressed analytically, another conflict arises. 
The agency of white feminists is not only incoherent because of the different routes to 
‘intersectional social change’, in its interior it is characterised by tension. The gendered 
and raced agency of white women work in themselves as, what could be called, ‘agentic 
axes’ and, as structuring forces, operate differently and often contradictorily. This is 
reinforced in the light of feminist activism and the struggle for transformation of power 
relations; where agency is manifested both and often simultaneously as action and 
inaction. I will come back to these points, but will first explore the differentiation of 
layers in intersectional analysis.  
 
Layers of Intersectional Analysis 
 The distinction in intersectionality that I propose here, to emphasise, is merely 
analytical. According to this distinction (see also Table 2 below) I suggest that one can 
call layer 1 the junction of axes. This ‘moment of intersection’ results in the location of 
layer 2, which, then, is the junction of the manifestations on these axes. Following the 
aforementioned differentiation between intersectionality as axes of social signification 
and as axes of power relations, I propose another layer; layer 3 is the junction of 
positions that layer 2 generates in power relations. The new – multiplicative – location 
where black women can be a ‘meaningful whole’, is empirically a whole position – but 
the axes can work in separate and even contradictory ways (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1252). If 
this is analysed according to this schema, one can distinguish in layer 1 ‘gender x race’ 
and in layer 2 ‘woman x black’. As multiple “negative intersections” (Hancock in Verloo, 
2009, p. 9), these layers coherently appear to coincide in layer 3: ‘disadvantaged, 
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Table 2: Layers of intersectional analysis: black women 
 
 White women, see Table 3 (below), share layer 1 with black women. As discussed 
in the previous sections, the manifestations on these axes are different in layer 2. This 
becomes significant in terms of a political project and its theoretical and empirical 
complexity, when this is analysed in layer 3; The location of white women is 
categorically marked by, first, disadvantage on the axis of gender (layer 1) and its 
manifestation as female (layer 2) and, second, by advantage on the axis of race (layer 1) 
and its manifestation as white (layer3). This might be a ‘new’ location but surely is not a 
coherent location. To the contrary, it is tensional and, at least theoretically, contradictory 
if not oppositional in its interior. The critique on the parallel and additive or accumulative 
approach of intersectionality which suggests that experiences of people of colour “occur 
on mutually exclusive terrains” (Crenshaw, 1991, pp. 1240-1241) on axes of social 
signification, could now be applied to the experiences of white women on axes of power 
relations. This brings about a conceptual problem in theorising intersectionality; if white 
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women intersectionally ‘define and confine interests’ (Ibid, p. 1252) from their racial, 
white, axis and at the same time (potentially) ‘produce and transform power relations’ 
from their gendered, female, axis, how do they do that at the same time? How do their 
defining and confining side, as intersectional manifestations, and their productive and 
transformative side, as agentic manifestations, function in the same moment? How do we 
have to understand their intersectional (here gender x race, female x white) position as 
multiplicative, when these interlinking grids hold disadvantage and advantage, are 
marginalised and normative – and, consequently, seem incompatible? How can they be a 
‘meaningful whole’ when their intersectional status works, from within, in opposition, 
but is, simultaneously, mutually influential? 
 
 
Table 3: Layers of intersectional analysis: white women 
 
 Verloo7
                                               
7 In addition to intersectionality, Verloo (2009) introduces the concept of interference. Interference could be 
visualised as waves of systems of social inequality that (partially or temporarily) influence each other and 
might or might not coincide.  
 (2009, p.9) underscores the need to research ‘people who in terms of 
power take opposite positions in the various dimensions of inequality’. She draws 
attention to the possibility that an advantageous position on one axis (for example 
race/white) can compensate or neutralise a disadvantageous position on another axis (as 
gender/female), and that tables can even be turned so that a disadvantage becomes an 
advantage. An issue I would like to propose is related to Verloo’s point, but with a 
significant alteration. Initially, I discussed layer 3 as another ‘step’ in intersectional 
analysis through which it was related to and followed layer 2 and layer 1. On top of this, I 
propose now to complicate their relation and argue that layer 3 is not only distinctive but 
can be analytically separated from layer 2 and, subsequently, layer 1; thus, 
intersectionality understood as the junction of axes of social signification is different 
from, though intertwined with, intersectionality as the junction of positions in power 
relations. Even though people, and certainly not black or even white women, are not 
necessarily approached or even understood as ‘meaningful wholes’, in the material sense 
 Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol 13 #2 March 2012  13 
anyone is a ‘whole’ – after all can we imagine one leg to be raced, the other gendered – 
as if they were ‘mutually exclusive terrains’? Meaningful and unified or not, at the end, 
empirically one cannot be split into parts, categories, be it axes; the separation of axes, 
that is dissociating ‘what happens in/as race’ from ‘what happens in/as gender’, is, again, 
an analytical exercise. As an analytical approach, then, I argue that the dissociation of 
layer 3 from its relation to layer 1 and 2 brings tension to the forefront in the 
intersectionality of – white, feminist activists – agency and contributes to the 
understanding of intersectional agency. 
 
Intersectional Agency 
 Traditionally, agency, much like intersectionality, has functioned in feminism as a 
concept to understand “struggles for empowerment” (Davis, 2008, p. 71). If agency, 
though, is limited to empowerment because intersectionality is limited to the 
‘jeopardised, dominated and marginalised subjects’, then the “production and 
transformation of relations of power” (Ibid) can only be researched from the location of 
those with disadvantaged access to power. As a theoretical (be it methodological or 
epistemological) framework, I argue, intersectional theory facilitates the problematisation 
of all positions – experiences and manifestations – on axes of social signification and, as 
such, positions in power relations. In the previous section I discussed that 
intersectionality should by differentiated in layers of analysis with the purpose of, inter 
alia, researching intersectional agency. Before elaborating on that point, I would like to 
explore the concepts of agency and action – acknowledging that a (tentative) definition is 
not in the scope of this article. 
 Following Alexander (1992) and Campbell (2009), I argue that agency cannot be 
conflated with action; agency and action are different phenomena of the individual and 
social world. Hence, I recognise the individual as more than social and, though on other 
grounds, agree with Chalari (2009) that the individual is constituted of an internal and 
external world and, respectively, acts via intra-action and via action or inter-action. 
Action, argued Alexander (1992, p. 8), could be approached as “the movement of a 
person through time and space”, though it is much more and much less than agency. 
Agency, then, is associated with purposefulness (Ritzer & Goodman, 2004, p. 469; 
Sztompka, 1993, p. 200) and/or intentional behaviour (Barnes, 2000, p. 10; Mouzelis, 
2008, p. 36), with reflexivity, consciousness and awareness (Archer, 2003; Barnes, 2000, 
p. 10) and, most importantly, with empowerment and transformation (Dugan & Reger, 
2006, pp. 469-470; Sztompka, 1993, pp. 37-40, 200). This resonates with the social 
transformative character and objective of feminist activism. Albeit little consensus on 
what agency actually ‘is’ or how it operates, with some agreement agency could be 
understood as the (individual, social) capacity or “ability to accomplish action” 
(Campbell, 2009, p. 410). Taking into account the explorative character here in the 
conceptualisation of agency, I would like to suggest that there is, at least, an element of 
‘choice’, i.e. an “option of doing otherwise” (Ibid, p. 414); an agentic moment8
                                               
8 An agentic moment resonates with the idea of ‘choice’ and the simultaneity of intersectionality, but also 
alludes to a monolithic and causal idea of agency that lacks the complexity that I propose. Both context and 
process enable to think agency in a dynamic and multidimensional way, but, in turn, confuse the idea of 
‘choice’. For now, I will use ‘agentic moment’.  
 when and 
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where agency is mobilised and exercised by the individual; when action becomes agentic 
and the actor an agent. 
First (see Table 4), this suggests that agency is not always mobilised and, 
consequently, exercised and manifested. And, contra the conflation of agency with 
action, this can imply that even when there is action, this action might not always be 
agentic; when there is no agentic moment that caused the individual to perform this 
action. Think for example of a feminist individual who lets a pie fall on the tie of an anti-
abortion politician not because she intended or desired so, without having made the 
choice to do so (even when intended in the past), but because someone else pushed her. 
There was no agentic moment, no agency that caused her action, but there was action; 
this could be considered non-agentic action.  
Second, this raises the question what happens when agency is mobilised. If the 
feminist individual chooses to let the pie fall (she could have done otherwise, namely not 
let the pie fall), and subsequently she does so, we can identify her action as agentic. Since 
agency cannot be equated with action, we can assume that not each manifestation of 
agency is action. I argue that we have to consider the possibility that some manifestations 
of agency are not action. Think of the same feminist individual. She wants to throw this 
pie to the sexist politician, but decides, i.e. she made the choice, not to throw it (she 
might have reconsidered that the pie would be nice with coffee afterwards); there was an 
agentic moment that did not generate action. This is what I name inaction; a void in 
action - where action is absent, but where this absent action is a manifestation of agency, 
what I call agentic inaction. In a Table, this looks as follows: 
 
  
Table 4: agency x action 
 
Without having offered an exact or infinite definition of either agency or 
in/action, let’s, for the sake of the argument, assume that we agree more or less that all 
exist as outlined. When talking about intersectional agency, I will now argue that 
specifically inaction is central to understand its complexity and internally tensional 
relation. 
 Feminism aims at social transformation in the field of gender relations, gender 
discrimination and inequality and, on a more systemic level, sexism and patriarchy. 
Whichever way you define agency, taking action by changing yourself and/or your 
environment forms the basis of feminist activism; without action there will be no social 
transformation. Speaking, as an active manifestation of agency, might modify gender 
relations in a setting where traditional behaviour for women is silence, which, 
subsequently, can have an emancipatory effect on their disadvantaged gender position 
and gendered agency. In an interracial context, where there is a history of the silencing of 
feminists of colour, the act of speaking can perpetuate racial dominance and confirm the 
advantaged racial position and raced agency of white feminists. When this is crosscut 
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with the understanding of layer 3 of intersectionality, it can be argued that silence, as an 
inactive manifestation of agency, can work contrarily and can unsettle their advantaged 
racial, white, position and, subsequently, have a transformative effect on race relations by 
challenging the dominance of whiteness. But, contradictorily, this can also confirm its 
privilege and normativity by the absence of protest. 
 To illustrate this point, I would like to give an example of a feminist workshop on 
racial group dynamics. By discussing the dynamics of the groups’ race relations, the 
individual participants are compelledto mobilise their agency via intra-action in the form 
of reflexive deliberation and, as such, racial conscientisation; it could be argued that 
through the confrontation with collective race relations, one needs to, at least individually 
and – at least – internally, reflect upon one’s raciality. This setting, then, creates the 
prerequisites for external agency – be it via action or inaction. The fact that agency can 
be externalised into (inter-)action or can filtered out into an external ‘void’ (inaction), 
demonstrates, as previously suggested, that internal and external manifestations of agency 
can contrast. This contrast becomes more complex when is taken into account that, 
externally, agency can be manifested in various ways (as speech and praxis). If one of the 
white, young, feminist activists in the group is confronted with her racial identity and 
position inside and outside the group, which generates intra-action (reflexive 
deliberation), she can respond in various ways. In a workshop on collective racial 
dynamics, it can be expected that, at some moment, the racial agency of the white 
members will be problematised. This could include critique on (racial) dynamics in the 
group that lead to the marginalisation of black and ethnic minority activists and, 
generally, of racial issues as feminist. This critique might also address the dominant and 
privileged position of white, young feminist activists in the group and, generally, in the 
feminist movement which leads to the maintenance of the normativity of whiteness – for 
example, as argued, via silence or invisibility (i.e. via inaction). The white, young, 
feminist activist can internally consider these racial issues and is evoked to consider 
herself on the axis of race and in the racial dynamic of the group. In consequence, it 
would not be uncommon if white young, feminist activists feel the need to defend 
themselves ‘against’ these claims. Even though the ‘progressive or transformative’ 
character of their racial agency could be questioned, in their defence they do act 
agentically. The previously mentioned activist, then, has a choice to respond. She can 
respond via action or via inaction; she can withdraw her participation and not speak out, 
be silent. Since the dominance of whiteness can be manifested via the exorbitant 
occupation of space and time in interracial dynamics, for example via the hegemonisation 
of vocal racial interaction, silence can be an agentic attempt to break with a specific 
interracial dynamic and situate oneself differently in whiteness. On the same note, this 
silence can be agentic via the omission of action, by avoiding involvement, and, as such, 
inscribing the normativity of whiteness and its privilege that is characterised by the lack 
of need to speak out and up and problematised by one’s categorical racial advantage. In 
both cases it is external inaction, in both cases this inaction is agentic, but their intention 
and purpose – and transformative potential – is radically different. The position of white 
feminists can be reinforced on layer 3 by exercising inaction as a manifestation of racial 
agency, which is, in turn, characteristic of its position in layer 3; normativity, dominance 
and systemic advantage can be secured via non-interference – via inaction. This questions 
whether action can also have an adverse effect on social transformation and whether 
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action is always the route to social change? This, finally, leads to the question what the 




From an agentic perspective, intersectionality brings about a tensional position 
where young, white feminists do not obviously act as whole. Using the examples of the 
axes race, gender and, at the end, of age/generation and social-political commitment, it 
was shown that intersectionality cannot solely be approached via intersectionality as the 
junction of axes of social signification. Looking at intersectionality as different layers 
shows that the manifestations of these axes can work contradictorily when they are also 
understood as manifestations of relations of power. This (manifestations of axes in power 
relations), what I have called layer 3, uncovers the internal – apparent – contradiction in 
the intersectional location that some people, as white women, occupy, in which they are 
both advantaged and disadvantaged (etc) at the same time, at the same ‘place’. This raises 
the question how these manifestations in layer 3 are mutually influential and, 
subsequently, whether and how young, white feminist activists can, synergetically, act as 
a 'meaningful whole' in/from this location. Additionally, the idea of action brings about 
apparent contradictions when it becomes clear that agency can be exercised both via 
action and via inaction. Stereotypically, the aforementioned manifestations of social 
significations/power relations lean towards action and/or inaction. Both the axes and 
agency can work, actively and inactively, but they can, again, do so in apparently 
opposite modes. This theoretical exploration demonstrates that in the case of young, 
white, feminist activists, intersectionality – specifically looking at race, gender 
(age/generation and social-political commitment) – and agency do not clearly operate as a 
whole. But it is exactly this intersectional tension between axes (race, gender, etc) and 
agency (action, inaction) that can expose how they, on apparently internally opposite 
positions, do act from this 'new location' – as meaningfully whole or not. 
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